This paper examines the behaviour of the demand for money in Greece during 1976:1-2000:4, a period that included many of the influences that cause money-demand instability. Two empirical methodologies, vector error correction (VEC) modelling and second-generation random coefficient (RC) modelling, are used to estimate the demand for money. The coefficients of both the VEC and RC procedures support the hypothesis that the demand for money becomes more responsive to both the own rate of return on money balances and the opportunity cost of holding money because of financial deregulation. In general, both procedures also support the hypothesis that the income elasticity of money demand declines over time as a result of technological improvements in the payments system and the development of money substitutes, which lead to economies of scale in holding money.
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Introduction
The relation between the demand for money and its determinants is an essential component in most theories of macroeconomic behaviour. The empirical properties of the money-demand function, including its predictability and interest-rate and income elasticities, provide critical inputs in the formulation of monetary policy in many countries. Yet, empirical studies of money demand have had to confront such challenges as institutional changes, policy reversals, and regime changes, which have led to large forecasting errors and cast doubt about the usefulness of empirical money-demand models. 1 This paper estimates the demand for money in Greece. The Greek context provides a substantial challenge for empirical models of money demand. The past twenty-five years in
Greece have seen many of the circumstances that typically provide the greatest difficulty for money-demand estimation. There has been widespread innovation and a transition from a highly regulated to an unregulated financial system. There has also been a transition from profligate macro policies and high inflation (i.e., between 20 and 30 per cent) for much of the period to tight policies and inflation in the low single digits. The capital account has been opened. Monetary policy has switched from use of a narrow monetary aggregate as the main intermediate target, to a broad aggregate and, ultimately, to an exchange rate target.
The foregoing factors are likely to have caused changes in the responsiveness of the demand for money to its main determinants. To examine the evolution of Greek money demand, this paper applies two empirical methodologies --second-generation random coefficient (RC) modelling and vector error correction (VEC) modelling. Second-generation RC models estimate time-varying coefficients and relax several key restrictions often imposed in empirical estimation.
2 Thus, they can help explain the evolution of the demand for money given the structural changes in the Greek economy. VEC modelling addresses problems of spurious correlation produced by unit-root nonstationarities variables and dynamic misspecification due to inadequate lag structure, and attempts to integrate short-run dynamics 1 Surveys of the empirical money-demand literature include Goldfeld (1992) , Laidler (1993) , Thompson (1993) and Sriram (2001) . 2 Swamy and Tavlas (1995; 2001) distinguish between first-generation and second-generation random coefficient models. The former are strictly concerned with relaxing the assumption of constant coefficients, usually in a mechanical manner. The latter have focused on providing realistic rationale for relaxing several additional assumptions typically made in classical estimation.
with departures from long-run equilibrium relationships. 3 The aim of this paper is to use both methodologies to investigate the behaviour of money demand under conditions that are likely to have significantly impacted on that behaviour.
The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections. To provide context, Section 2 briefly reviews salient features of the Greek financial environment during the past twenty-five years and offers hypotheses about how changes in that environment might have affected the relationship between money demand and its determinants. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Although recent empirical work on money demand in Greece has focused on the behaviour of the narrower aggregates ( Karfakis (1991) , Psaradakis (1993) , and Papadopoulos and Zis (1997) ), the monetary aggregate used for estimation in this paper is M3, which served as the main aggregate guiding the conduct of monetary policy for much of the period under consideration. Section 4 describes the estimation procedures. Section 5 presents the empirical results. The theoretical model is estimated using VEC and RC with quarterly data over 1976:1 -1997:4 and post sample forecasts are generated over 1998:1 -2000:4, a period which saw a change in policy regime (discussed below) and a sharp acceleration in M3 growth because of the elimination of a withholding tax on repurchase agreements (repos). 4 The time-profiles of the VEC and RC coefficients are presented and discussed in light of the structural changes that took place during the estimation period.
Section 6 concludes.
Structural changes: Implications for money demand
In what follows a brief overview of the Greek economic and financial system during 1976-2000 is provided in terms of (1) financial deregulation, (2) inflation performance and (3) the targets of monetary policy. 5 The implications of changes in the financial system and financial stability for the parameters of the money-demand function are discussed.
Financial deregulation
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the financial system was tightly regulated. Interest rates were administratively set, compulsory investment requirements for banks channeled funds into priority sectors of the economy at subsidized interest rates (including the monetary financing of the government at below-market rates), and restrictions were placed on capital 
Inflation regimes
The past quarter century has witnessed three major inflation peaks, in 1979 -80, 1985 -86, and again in 1990 . In each instance, inflation rose to at least 20 percent.
Underlying the high rates of inflation were large government deficits. The general government deficit-to-GDP ratio averaged about 11 percent during 1981-94 ( Figure 1b ). The deficits were mainly financed by money creation, which provided seigniorage revenues.
Beginning around 1994-95, a policy regime change occurred 6 . Monetary policy was sharply tightened as real short-term interest rates rose above the 5 percent level; real rates stayed above that level for most of the remaining years of the 1990s. Fiscal policy was progressively tightened; the deficit-to-GDP ratio fell to 0.9 percent in 2000, from over 10 percent in 1995 ( Figure 1b) . Inflation declined sharply, reaching about 3 percent in 2000 (Figure 1a ) 7 .
Monetary policy
Monetary targets were first announced (for M0) in 1975. In 1983, the Bank of Greece began placing emphasis on M3, which remained the main intermediate target until 1995 6 Statistical evidence of a regime change in the inflation process around 1994-95 is presented in Garganas and Tavlas (2001) . Contributing to the regime change was the enactment of a law granting independence to the central bank. Although not passed by Parliament until December 1997, the impending legislation had been signalled to the markets well in advance. 7 The fall in inflation during 1995-2000 occurred against the backdrop of a steady acceleration of real growth. For the six years (i.e., 1995-2000) , real GDP growth averaged over 3 percent, compared with 1.2 percent in the preceding five years.
( Figure 1c ). During 1976-94, the targets for the monetary aggregates were often exceeded and monetary growth was at rates that were inconsistent with reasonable price stability. 8 In 1995
the Bank adopted a "hard drachma policy," under which the exchange rate was used as a nominal anchor. Although the Bank had previously (since the late 1980s) aimed to set a rate of depreciation of the drachma that did not fully accommodate inflation differentials between
Greece and the country's main trading partners, the targets were implicit and subsidiary to the M3 target. In 1995, the exchange rate target became explicit and took precedence over the M3 
Implications for money demand
The economic and financial environment presented a variety of influences that often caused money demand instability. As shown in Figure 1d , the income velocity of M3 appears to have been characterized by considerable changes during 1976-2000.
Financial deregulation in Greece, as elsewhere, has resulted in the availability of more money substitutes paying competitive rates of return and the availability of increasinglycompetitive rates of return on money balances. Other things remaining equal, the interest-rate elasticity of money demand, both with respect to the own rate (positive sign) and the rates on money substitutes (negative sign), should have risen in absolute value over time (Keely and Zimmerman (1986) , Bordo and Jonung (1987, pp. 17-18) , Tseng and Corker (1991) Financial development is usually considered to decrease the income elasticity of the demand for money (Laidler (1971) , Bordo and Jonung (1987, p. 149) , Thomas (1993, p. 367) .
Such factors as technological improvements in the payments system and the development of money substitutes lead to economies of scale in holding money. In this regard, Bordo and Jonung, (1987, p. 14) interpret the empirical evidence as showing that "the [income] elasticity overtime appears to decline to close to unity in the postwar period". 12 Also, improved economic stability, measured, for example, by a decline in the level and volatility of the inflation rate, can be expected to decrease the income elasticity of money (Bordo and Jonung (1987, p. 149) ).
Another possible influence on the income elasticity of money demand concerns wealth. Financial liberalization typically leads to balance-sheet expansion, with a rise in the financial wealth-to-income ratio. Because of data limitations, a financial wealth variable is not considered as a scale variable in this paper. However, it is important to note that the exclusion of such a variable when the wealth-to-income ratio is rising can influence the income elasticity of money demand. Assuming that the elasticity of money demand with respect to wealth is less than the elasticity with respect to income, an increase in the wealth-to-income ratio would produce a fall in the estimated income elasticity.
The possibility of changed elasticities over the sample period, in response to such factors as financial deregulation and financial development, suggests that, as Goldfeld and Sichel (1990, p. 322 ) have argued, any specification "which constrains the elasticity to be constant over the sample period may be inappropriate". In Section 4, we discuss an empirical approach that relaxes the constant-coefficient restriction.
10 Greek convergence efforts culminated in Greece's participation in the euro area, beginning on January 1, 2001. 11 The expected inflation rate has been used as a determinant of the demand for money in situations where controls exist in financial markets. In such situations, published interest rates do not reflect the proper opportunity cost of holding money. See Bordo and Jonung (1987, p. 16) . 12 Bordo and Jonung (1987; provide evidence showing that the inclusion of institutional variables in velocity functions reduces the income elasticity of the demand for money.
The model and data

The model
Theories of the demand for money attempt to explain one or more of the characteristics of money, stressing in particular the role of money as a transactions means and as an asset. In Greece, the main alternatives to holding money balances have been Treasury bills and real assets. Assuming that the asset choices of investors involve money (M),
Treasury bills, and real assets, the demand for real money balances can be written as follows:
where m is the log of M3, p is the price level, y is the log of real income, r m is the (nominal) own rate of return on money, ∆p e is the expected inflation rate, and r t is the T-bill rate. Lower-case letters denote logarithms except for the rates of return variables. In equation
(1), real rates of return are approximated by nominal rates minus the expected inflation rate and the (nominal) rate of return on real assets is represented by the expected inflation rate.
13
We further assume rate of return homogeneity of degree zero, implying that, if all rates of return change by x percent, real quantities of all assets in investors' portfolios relative to real income will change equiproportionately. Thus, only rates-of-return differentials affect money demand. As a numeraire we use M. The money demand function, written in a particular linear form form, becomes:
or, using t ∆Ρ as a proxy for the expected inflation rate,
where
The empirical implementation of equation (3) in the case of Greece entails several practical problems having to do with the previously regulated financial system. T-bills were not available to the public until 1985 and holdings of such instruments were not appreciable until 1990. Also, government bonds were sold beginning in 1990 and holdings of these bonds were modest until 1994. 14 Evidently, after the introduction of these instruments a period of adjustment was needed for economic agents to become familiar with them. In order to account for this factor with respect to T-bills, both a shift dummy and a slope dummy were used. With regard to the slope dummy, the interest rate differential between T-bills and the own rate on money was multiplied by a dummy which takes the value of unity beginning in 1990 (and zero prior to 1990). With regard to the interest rate on government bonds, we did not have sufficient observations to include this variable in the regressions. To account for its impact, a shift dummy, with a value equal to unity beginning in 1994:1 (and zero prior to 1994), was used in VEC estimation. Thus, a total of three dummy variables (two shift dummies and a slope dummy) were used in VEC estimation. RC estimation is intended to confront the effects of structural shifts produced by such factors as the introduction of new financial instruments.
Accordingly, a shift dummy was not introduced into RC estimation.
The data
The following data were used. (The source of all data is the Bank of Greece.)
1. M3 is comprised of currency, demand deposits, savings deposits, time deposits, repurchase agreements, and bank bonds (one-year instruments issued by specialized financial institutions).
2. An official quarterly series on GDP at constant market prices is not available over the sample period (i.e., 1975:1-2000:4) . Accordingly, we estimated a quarterly series on the basis of annual national accounts data, disaggregated by sector of economic activity, and the seasonal pattern of related indicators, which are available on a quarterly basis.
4. The industrial production variable is the general index of total industrial production (1993=100).
5. The price variable is the consumer price index (1994=100).
Estimation methods
VEC estimation
An objective of VEC is to test for the existence of a long-run equilibrium, or cointegrating, relationship among the variables in equation (3). If such a relationship is found to exist, it is augmented with lagged differences of these variables and other stationary variables that economic theory may suggest as belonging in equation (3) in an attempt to capture the short-run dynamics of the variables in the system. 15 Standard methodology employs a three-step procedure (see, for example, Enders, (1995) ). In the first step, the variables are tested for stationarity using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
tests. The second step involves VAR estimation and mispecification testing and tests for cointegration among the integrated variables. In this paper, the Johansen (1991) maximum likelihood procedure is used. The Johansen procedure tests for the significance of all the cointegrating vectors between the variables. Two tests are used to evaluate the number of cointegrating relationships: the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test. With four endogenous variables (in equation (3)), the Johansen procedure yields at most three cointegrating vectors. This procedure treats all the variables included in equation (3) as endogenous, thus avoiding an arbitrary assumption of exogeneity. It provides a unified approach for estimating and testing cointegrating relations within the framework of a VEC model. Provided that one or more cointegrating relationships exist, the third step of the standard procedure involves the estimation of a VEC specification containing the cointegrating relationship(s), lagged first differences of the variables in the cointegrating relationship(s), and any stationary variables thought to influence money demand. Since this third stage depends on the outcomes of the tests conducted in steps 1 and 2, preliminary testing biases arise. These biases can lead to incorrect conclusions as shown by Greene (2000, pp. 292, 341) .
RC estimation
Standard estimation procedures often impose a number of restrictions when applied to equations such as equation (3) above, including the following 16 : (i) δ δ δ 0 , , 1 2 , δ 3 , and δ 4 are constants; (ii) the net effect of excluded explanatory variables is represented by an additive error term and, therefore, this net effect is assumed to have mean equal to zero and to be mean independent of the included explanatory variables; (iii) the true functional form is known (whether linear or non-linear); and, (iv) the included explanatory variables are not subject to measurement error. Restrictions (iii) and (iv) cannot be correct in practice and their correct version contradicts restrictions (i) and (ii).
To explain, consider the following realistic situation: the true functional forms of economic relationships are unknown and the economic data contain measurement errors.
These conditions are the correct versions of restrictions (iii) and (iv), respectively. These versions show that the additive error term (the assumption of an additive error is itself misleading) in equation (3) is a function of the difference between the specified functional form and the true functional form and the measurement errors contained in the included explanatory variables. In these circumstances, the property of the additive error term violates restriction (ii), since the error term cannot have mean zero and cannot be mean-independent of the included explanatory variables. As shown below, it also violates restriction (i). Thus, if equation (3) contains contradictory restrictions, it cannot coincide with the true moneydemand function. Tavlas (1995, 2001) and Chang et al. (2000) define as true (i) any economic relationship with the correct functional form, without any omitted explanatory variables, and without incorrectly measured variables. Using this definition, we can specify a class of functions, which is wide enough to cover the true money-demand function (in the sense of definition (i) as a member). To rewrite this class in a form that has the same explanatory variables as equation (3), we assume that explanatory variables that are in the true money-demand function, but excluded from equation (3), are related linearly or nonlinearly to the explanatory variables included in equation (3). This assumption is reasonable, given that economic variables are rarely, if ever, uncorrelated and may not be linearly related to each other. To account for measurement errors, we assume that the observations on each variable in equation (3) are the sums of "true" values and measurement errors.
How does RC estimation (RCE) utilize these assumptions to eliminate the foregoing four contradictory restrictions? We would like to specify a model that approximates closely the underlying true economic relationship. Following Swamy and Tavlas (2001) and Chang et al. (2000) , our specified model can only coincide with the underlying true relationship if: (1) each of its slope coefficients is the sum of three terms --a bias-free effect, an ommitedvariables bias, and a measurement error; and (2) its intercept is the sum of three terms --the true intercept, the measurement error in its dependent variable, and a combination of the intercepts of the relationships between the included and excluded explanatory variables. With regard to the coefficients on included explanatory variables, the bias-free effect components of these coefficients are the coefficients that would be observed if ( i) there were no measurement errors, (ii) there were no omitted variables biases, and (iii) the specified functional form was true. The omitted-variables bias terms arise due to the fact that the true values of included explanatory variables affect those of excluded explanatory variables, which, in turn, influence the true value of the dependent variable. The measurement-error biases effects are due to errors in the measurement of the included explanatory variables.
From these interpretations it follows that equation (3) can coincide with the true money demand function only if the coefficients on its included explanatory variables are timevarying. The sum of the intercept of equation (3) and t u is also time-varying, since it is equal to a sum of three time-varying terms.
As discussed above, to capture short-run dynamics, VEC estimation augments longrun equilibrium relationships with lagged differences of variables. To help capture the dynamics under RC, we assume lagged adjustment of actual money balances to desired balances occurs; only some fraction of the desired adjustment is accomplished in any one period and this fraction is time varying. Algebraically,
where the coefficient of adjustment λ t , is time dependent and varies within a finite interval.
Also, as RC estimation accounts for the effects of omitted variables, the effects of any omitted dynamic factors can be captured in the omitted-variables bias term.
Substituting equation (3) (4) gives:
( ) In this equation, the d's are correlated with each other and with the explanatory variables. These are the implications of the correct interpretations (given above) of d's (see Swamy and Tavlas (2001) ). Equation (5) with all these correlations is the same as an equation in a simultaneous system without any exogenous variables. Therefore, it cannot be used to derive the conditional moments of its dependent variable given the values of its included explanatory variables. One question that needs to be addressed before estimating equation (5) is that of parameterisation: which features of equation (5) Assumption II. The explanatory variables of equation (5) are independent of their coefficients' error terms, and, in addition λ t is independent of the coefficients of equation (3) given the values of the concomitants.
Assumption II captures the idea that the explanatory variables of equation (5) where the z's denote concomitants the ε 's denote the error terms of the coefficients of equation (5), and the right-hand-side with the error terms suppressed gives the conditional mean of ( ) t p m − , given the concomitants.
It might be helpful at this point to summarise the above discussion on an intuitive level, leaving more formal discussions for the interested reader (see Tavlas and Swamy (2001)). Empirical models often contain problems of omitted variables and measurement errors, introducing biases into the coefficients. It can be shown that each coefficient in any specified model is comprised of three terms: (1) a bias-free coefficient, (2) an omittedvariables-bias term, and (3) a measurement-error-bias-term. This circumstance leads to two main consequences. First, as the estimated coefficient co-mingles three terms, it would be desirable to separate the bias-free coefficient from the other two terms. Second, the structure of the three terms is such that their sum in not independent of the included explanatory variables.
To deal with these two consequences, RC estimation introduces two assumptions.
Assumption I uses concomitants to explain the variations in each of the three terms of a coefficient. In particular, it splits the set of included concomitants into two subsets in such a way that one subset estimates the bias-free component and the other subset estimates the combined omitted-variables-bias term and the measurement-error-bias term. Assumption II accomplishes the independence between the explanatory variables and the remainders of coefficients obtained after removing the effects of concomitants on the coefficients (the s ' ε in equation (6)). That is, any variations in the coefficients not explained by the concomitants are assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables. In this way, the conditional expectation of the dependent variable is obtained.
In the estimation that follows, we set p=3, z 0t =1 for all t, z 1t = the industrial production index, and z 2t = the percentage change in the deposit rate. An Akaike Information Criterion, a Schwarz Bayesian Criterion, and a likelihood ratio test (Sims test) were used to test the hypothesis that all three specifications are equivalent. Each of 17 The percentage change in the deposit rate and the level of industrial production were used as concomitants because of their likely correlation with the included explanatory variables. As indicated by the fact that we had to construct a quarterly series for GDP, the number of available quarterly series that could serve as concomitants was limited.
Empirical results
18 Note that equation (6) has six error terms, five of which are the products of ε 's and the included explanatory variables of equation (5). The sum of these six terms is both heteroscedastic and serially correlated. This result shows that the addition of a single error term to a mathematical equation and the exclusion of the interaction terms on the right-hand side of equation (6) The estimation procedure assumes unrestricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR.
The two shift dummies are left unrestricted. To test for cointegration, we used the Johansen maximum likelihood approach employing both the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics.
Both test statistics rejected the null of zero cointegrating vectors in favor of one cointegrating vector at the 5 per cent level of significance. As reported in Table 2 , likelihood ratio tests (described in Johansen (1992) and Johansen and Juselius (1992) ) indicate that all the coefficients in the cointegrating relationship are statistically significant.
Having determined that the variables are cointegrated, VECM can be applied. The weak endogeneity of the four variables that is the log of the stock of real money balances (mp), the log of real income (y), the own rate of M3 ( r m ) and the spread between the T-bill rate and the own rate ( r r t m − ) was tested through the Error Correction Term (ECT). The size and the statistical significance of the ECT measures the extent to which the dependent variable has the tendency to return to its long-run equilibrium. The Wald-tests for the ECTs indicated that money balances and real income were not weakly exogenous (Wald statistics = 14.01 and 14.15 respectively). The own rate and the interest-rate differential were weakly exogenous (Wald statistics = 0.34 and 1.80 respectively).
In addition, the two shift dummy variables were not statistically significant in the estimated error correction models (ECM) for the own rate and the interest rate differential.
The estimated t-statistics are equal to -1.83 and -0.29 for the two dummies in the own rate equation and -0.79 and 0.28 in the interest rate differential equation. These results indicate that both variables (own rate and interest rate differential) are super exogenous since there is a regime shift in the money demand equation but no significant dummies in the own rate and interest rate differential equations.
The VEC and RC results are shown in Table 3 , which reports the coefficients estimated over 1976:1-1997:4 and the root mean square errors (RMSEs) for 1998:1-2000:4.
For the RC specification, the coefficients are the long-run average values of the individual time-varying coefficients and the corresponding t-ratios. Three sets of RC results are reported:
(1) RC1 applies RC estimation to equation (6) without concomitants (other than the constant term); (2) RC2 applies RC estimation to equation (6) with a single (other than the constant term) concomitant (the annual percentage change in the deposit rate); and (3) RC3 applies RC estimation to equation (6) with two (other than the constant term) concomitants (the annual percentage change in the deposit rate and the level of industrial production).
As shown in Table 3 , both the RC and VEC models produce estimates of the elasticities of income and the opportunity cost variables that are within the range of estimates yielded in previous empirical studies of money demand (e.g., see Laidler (1993) ). The VEC specification gives a long-run income elasticity of 1.67, which is close to the implied long-run elasticity of 1.62 given by RC1; note, however, that the addition of concomitants results in a progressively lower (implied) long-run income elasticity in the RC models. The use of a broad monetary aggregate may have contributed to higher income elasticities than those found in other recent papers on Greek money demand. 20 The semi-elasticity of the opportunity cost variable is greater in absolute value under VEC than under the RC specification, though this finding could reflect the inclusion of the expected inflation rate as a separate variable under RC. The own rate semi-elasticity is also higher under VEC than under RC.
As noted, the post-sample forecast period is 1998:1 -2000:4. This period provides a good test of forecasting ability. A regime change occurred in March 1998 when the drachma was devalued and joined the ERM (see Section 2.3). In September 1998, a 15 percent withholding tax on repos, which are included in M3, was lifted. As a result, a portfolio shift into repos occurred and M3 growth shot up from an annual rate of 4.4 percent in 1998, to 22.0 percent in 1999 and 16.7 percent in 2000. Also, in 1999 the Bank of Greece discontinued the KPSS) suggest that all the series except the inflation rate are I (1) processes while the inflation rate is an I (0) process. 20 Previous studies of Greek money demand, using narrower aggregates, report the following elasticities. Papadopoulos and Zis (1997) obtain elasticities of 1.49 for M.1 and 2.04 for M2. Karfakis (1991) and Psaradakis (1993) , both using M1, obtain elasticities of 1.15 and 1.45 respectively. practice of using M3 as an intermediate target variable. As shown in Table 3 , RC1 produces a RMSE of 5.1 per cent. Adding concomitants in the RC specification successively reduces RMSEs, to 4.5 per cent under RC2 and to 4.1 percent under RC3. The RMSE for VEC is 11.8 per cent.
As pointed out in the last paragraph of Section 4.2, the use of two concomitants in RC3 permits a separation of the bias-free effects components from the coefficients, which are called "total" effects because they include omitted-variable and measurement-error biases.
These effects are reported in Table 4 . The differences between the average total and bias-free effects are small. Therefore, based on the two assumptions (Assumption I and II) used to derive equation (6) from equation (5), measurement-error and omitted-variable biases would not appear, on average, to have had a significant effect on the RC biased effect estimates.
To examine how the behaviour of the RC coefficients corresponds to a priori considerations, the time-varying behavior of the coefficients, based on RC3 estimation, was used to trace the time profile of the coefficients (both bias-free and biased effects). These balances is inversely related to the degree of development of the financial system. Also, the result is consistent with findings (noted in Section 2) of previous empirical studies that the income elasticity has a tendency to approach unity. As noted in Section 2, however, the declining income elasticity could also be capturing a rise in the wealth-to-income ratio, which could not be used because of data limitations. Third, the time profiles of the own-rate and opportunity cost coefficients are each consistent with the hypothesis that the demand for money has become more responsive to both the own-rate and the rates on money substitutes because of financial deregulation and financial development. As shown in Figure 3 , the own rate coefficient rises from about .01 at the beginning of the estimation period to about .03 at the end of the period. As shown in Figure 4 , the (negative) coefficient on the T-bill rate-own rate differential rises in absolute value from around .01 to about .04. The (negative) coefficient on the expected inflation rate rises in absolute value from about .01 to around .02.
The VEC model was re-estimated recursively; the time profiles of the coefficients are also displayed in Figures 2 through 4 . 21 As shown in Figure 2 , the income elasticity of the VEC fell from about 1.7 in 1982 to around 1.4 in 1993; by 1993 the VEC estimate converged to that provided by RCE. In 1994:1, the VEC elasticity displays an upward shift, rising to about 1.7, where it remains for the remainder of the period.
Regarding the VEC own rate and T-bill differential elasticities, as reported in Figures   3 and 4, respectively, the time profiles show that the semi-elasticities increase in absolute value during the course of the estimation period, which is consistent with the RCE results.
The absolute values of the recursive VEC estimates are somewhat higher than the comparable RC estimates; this result may be due to the use of the expected inflation rate as an additional proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money in the RC specification. The use of this proxy may have resulted in lower semi-elasticities of the own rate and the interest-rate differential in the RC specification. It is also worth pointing out that the time profile of the interest rate differential term produced by recursive VEC estimation closely follows that of the biased effect produced by RCE ( Figure 4 ). As noted above, the biased effect of (or the coefficient on) the interest-rate differential in equation (5) is not purged of omitted-variable and measurement-error biases.
The differing behavioural patterns of the RC and VEC recursive estimates of the income coefficient, beginning in 1994, warrant further comment. The higher elasticity given by recursive VEC estimation is to be expected. Recall, a dummy variable was used beginning in 1994:1 to pick up the effect of sales of government bonds to the public. Inclusion of the dummy appears to affect the coefficient on income, allowing it to shift back upward so that, in effect, a stable, long-run coefficient is obtained over the entire period. By changing the income elasticity, the shift dummy produces cointegration.
Recursive VEC estimation is a way of testing for stability. If the structure is changing, however, recursive VEC estimation does not give consistent estimates of the changing parameters. Unlike RC estimation, an underlying assumption of recursive estimation in that the coefficients are constant. Also, recursive estimation does not write off the past. If a regime change has occurred, it averages the old regime with the new regime with changing weights; the weight of the new regime becomes larger as more and more observations are added. Using recursive estimation, the best estimate of a model is that produced by the entire sample. RCE, in contrast, picks up a new regime quickly. By consistently estimating changing coefficients, it attempts to estimate how the true coefficient is changing at each point in time.
As discussed, recursive estimation is relevant for testing the hypothesis of stability.
Accordingly, the stability of the long-run relationship was tested using recursive VEC estimation of the one-step Chow test, break point Chow test, and forecast Chow test. The results indicate some instability at the 5 per cent level of significance in the estimated relationship in the mid-1990s. Cointegration, however, requires stable long-run parameters.
While the coefficients fluctuated in the short run, the shift dummy allowed the estimated coefficients to return to their long-run values, thereby providing cointegration. The Chow procedure tests for stability in the short run in each period. Therefore, we can conclude that there is instability in some periods in the short run. 
Conclusions
This paper has estimated the demand for money in Greece over a period involving considerable structural change. The results of VEC and RC estimation show that money demand became more responsive to both the own rate of return on money balances and the opportunity cost of holding money because of financial deregulation. In general, both procedures also support the hypothesis that the income elasticity of money demand declines over time as a result of technological improvements in the payments system and the development of money substitutes, which lead to economies of scale in holding money.
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